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X. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this 
Divorce matter pursuant to Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as amended; Rules 52(a) and 63(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. 
DOES RONALD'S JUNE 5, 1995 "REQUEST FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE ANTHONY 
SCHOFIELD" CONSTITUTE AN AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE AND IF 
SO, WAS IT IMPROPER FOR THE JUDGE TO ISSUE HIS OWN RULING DENYING 
THE REQUEST AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE EFFECT ON RONALD OF ANY ORDERS 
ISSUED BY HIM THEREAFTER? 
- STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Once an affidavit is filed questioning the neutrality of the 
judge, the judge must either certify the affidavit to another 
judge for review or transfer the case. - Rule 63(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct App. 
1994); Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962). 
The record contains papers filed June 5, 1995 encaptioned 
"Request for Recusal of Judge Anthony Schofield" and the record 
also contains the court's own Ruling dated June 7, 1995. 
II. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE DOCUMENTARY 
EVIDENCE UPON WHICH IT SOLELY RELIED IN FINDING THAT 
THE APPELLANT'S BUSINESS AND PERSONAL EXPENSES APPEAR 
TO BE OVERSTATED. 
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- STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
On appeal of a judgment from the bench after trial, the 
appellate court defers to the trial court's factual assessment 
unless there is clear error. Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & 
Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988; Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 
819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). However, when reviewing trial court's 
finding based solely on written materials and involving no 
assessment of witness credibility or competency, the Court of 
Appeals is in as good a position as the trial court to examine 
the evidence de novo and determine the facts, rather than review 
the determination under the standard set forth in Rule 52(a); In 
re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); also, 11 
A.L.R. Fed. 212. 
III. 
WHETHER THE AWARD OF $250 PER MONTH IN ALIMONY TO THE 
EX-WIFE IS CORRECT GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
SHE NOW HAS THE ABILITY TO SUPPORT HERSELF AT A 
STANDARD OF LIVING WHICH IS ACTUALLY GREATER THAN SHE 
ENJOYED DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
- STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
While findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous, conclusions of law are simply reviewed for 
correctness without any special deference. T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 
P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah 
Ct App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The test of whether 
termination of alimony is appropriate is whether the wife is able 
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to provide for herself a standard of living equal to that enjoyed 
during the marriage of the parties. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 
786 P.2d 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
IV. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION WAS CORRECT THAT 
RELIEF BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO JANUARY 1, 1995 
RATHER THAN TO THE AUGUST 10, 1994 FILING DATE OF 
PETITION TO MODIFY INVOKING A LUMP SUM OBLIGATION ON 
THE APPELLANT OF MORE THAN $12,000, GIVEN A FINDING 
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO RELIEF AS OF THE 
FILING DATE AND GIVEN A FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT HAS 
NO ASSETS LEFT TO DRAW UPON. 
- STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
See STANDARD OF REVIEW for Issue III above. Further, a 
decree as to alimony must be determined upon facts, conditions 
and circumstances of parties in each particular case, and if, 
upon examination of the record, the Court holds that the award in 
the trial court in inequitable and unjust, it should direct such 
a decree as it finds to be just and equitable. Hendricks, v. 
Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277 (1936), modified, 91 Utah 
564, 65 P.2d 642 (1937) . 
V. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN THE FIRST PLACE, 
IN HOLDING THE APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT FOR UNDERPAYMENT 
OF TEMPORARY ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT WITHOUT FINDINGS 
AS TO THE APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO PAY AND IN THE SECOND 
PLACE, IN FAILING TO REVISIT THE CONTEMPT MATTER AFTER 
MAKING FINDINGS AFTER TRIAL FAIL TO CONTAIN THE 
NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF CONTEMPT, AND IN THIRD PLACE, IN 
IMPOSING PUNITIVE SANCTIONS UPON THE APPELLANT PURSUANT 
TO THE CONTEMPT ORDER. 
- STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
See STANDARD OF REVIEW, for Third and Fourth Issues above. 
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Further, a party may not be held in contempt for failing to make 
payments required by a divorce decree in absence of findings that 
a proper order had been violated and that the defendant was able 
to pay, or intentionally deprived himself of the means of 
compliance. Parish v. McConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P.2d 1001 
(1934); Hillyard v. District Court, 28 Utah 220, 249 P.806 
(1926) . 
VI. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ORDERING THE 
APPELLANT TO PAY EX-WIFE BACK CHILD SUPPORT FOR 21-
YEAR-OLD SON FOR THE MONTHS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 
1994, IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,066 ABSENT A FINDING THAT THE 
SON WAS ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL 
DECREE. 
- STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with 
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon. Rule 52(a) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the duty of the trial judge in 
contested cases to find facts upon all material issues submitted 
for decision unless findings are waived. Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 
567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). Failure to find upon all material 
issues raised by the pleadings is reversible error. LeGrand 
Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This action originally was initiated when Gail filed for 
divorce on December 28, 1992. (C.R. 551) A Default Decree was 
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entered on January 19, 1993. Ronald, not having been noticed of 
the January 19, 1993 hearing, hired an attorney and filed a 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on April 19, 1993. (C.R. 
550) Before the Motion to Set Aside could be ruled upon the 
parties stipulated to a modification of the original decree. On 
February 11, 1994, pursuant to the stipulation, an Order 
Modifying the Decree was entered. This action rendered moot the 
Motion to Set Aside. (C.R. 549) 
On August 10, 1994, Ronald filed his present Petition to 
Modify the decree seeking to eliminate the $2,4 65 per month 
alimony and reduce child support from $533 per child to guideline 
levels.(C.R. 551) On August 30, 1994 Gail filed an Order to Show 
Cause claiming arrearages of child support and alimony. An 
evidentiary hearing was held January 30, 1995 on Gail's Order to 
Show Cause. At this hearing the parties agreed to interim 
alimony of $1,000 per month and child support of $533 for the one 
remaining minor child giving retroactive effect to January 1, 
1995. (C.R. 549) Trial was set for April 26, 1995. 
On February 14, 1995 Ronald amended his Petition to Modify 
with respect to child support. (C.R. 548) On April 25, 1995, the 
day before the scheduled trial, Gail's counsel requested and was 
granted a postponement of trial. At this time, Judge Schofield 
disclosed that his daughter worked closely with a member of 
Gail's household and some communication had occurred. Ronald's 
counsel and the judge did not agree on what was said in the off-
record conversation. Ronald had already traveled to Utah from 
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California when he learned of the postponement and Judge 
Schofield's potential conflict. 
On May 23, 1995, Gail filed an Order to Show Cause motion 
alleging nonpayment or underpayment of interim alimony. (C.R. 
548) On that same date the court signed a proposed Order from 
Evidentiary Hearing January 30, 1995 prepared by Gail's counsel. 
(C.R. 227) Ron's counsel had earlier filed a timely objection to 
the proposed order citing differences in understanding of the 
January agreement. The Order to Show Cause hearing was set for 
May 30, 1995 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. (the morning after the 
Memorial Day holiday weekend). Ronald did not attend the hearing 
but was represented by counsel. Ronald was found to be current 
on child support but delinquent by $2,000 in interim alimony, 
found guilty of contempt for willful refusal to pay $2,000 in 
alimony and ordered to pay $350 in fees to Gail. Further 
sanctions against him were reserved for trial. (C.R. 342) 
On June 5, 1995, Ronald dismissed his counsel and proceeded 
pro se. Also on June 5, 1995 Ronald filed a Request for Recusal 
of Judge Anthony Schofield. (See Addendum) On June 7, 1995 Judge 
Schofield issued his own minute Ruling denying Ronald's request 
for recusal. (See Addendum) Ronald also filed motions for new 
hearings on the January 30, 1995 and the May 30, 1995 rulings. 
On June 27, 1995 Ronald served Gail with an Order to Show 
cause to be heard July 5, 1995. Ronald requested that the court 
allow him to remove Gail as beneficiary of his life insurance and 
that she be ordered to receive psychiatric counselling. The 
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event that gave rise to Ronald's request was a recent - telephone 
call from Gail in which she demanded payment and threatened his 
life. Ronald attended the OSC hearing and Gail's attorney 
appeared and requested a continuance since Gail was vacationing 
in Hawaii. The continuance was granted and the court ordered 
both parties to file witness lists no later than July 21, 1995 
since trial was now set for August 3, 1995. (C.R. 347) The court 
also continued an OSC hearing requested by Gail that had been set 
for July 19, 1995. 
On August 1, 1995 Gail's counsel Mark Stringer, citing 
personal reasons, requested a further postponement of trial. 
Over Ronald's objection the court postponed the trial to 
September 14, 1995. 
On September 11, 1995 Gail's counsel requested leave to 
withdraw which was denied. Trial was held September 14, 1995 
with Gail represented by counsel Mark Stringer and Ronald 
appearing pro se. Closing arguments were heard September 27, 
1995. On January 30, Mark Stringer was disqualified as Gail's 
counsel pursuant to a motion brought by Ronald. 
The court's final judgment was entered January 22, 1996. 
(C.R. 552) Both parties filed timely Motions to Amend or for New 
Trial. (C.R. 478) On April 3, 1996 the court issued a Minute 
order denying both Motions. Ronald's Notice of Appeal was filed 
on April 30, 1996 
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B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This appeal turns on three basic facts and circumstances: 
1) The trial judge was presented with a formal request to 
recuse himself on June 5, 1996 and on June 7, 1995 the judge 
issued his own ruling denying that request, (see Addendum for 
Request for Recusal, Ruling thereon); 
2) Based solely upon a reading of Ronald's income tax 
return and financial declaration, the court made certain 
findings as to his income and expenses which Ronald contends are 
clearly erroneous and as such resulted in an unfair judgment. 
(See addendum: Findings of Fact, Defendant's Exhibits #3 & #8 and 
Ronald's Financial Declaration) 
3) Where the trial court made certain findings which appear 
to be accurate, the court drew legal conclusions that in Ronald's 
view do not follow those findings, to wit: 
a) The court found that Gail, due to her improved 
education and professional status was now employed and 
capable of supporting herself at a standard of living 
greater than she enjoyed during the marriage, yet failed to 
terminate alimony as requested; (Findings of Fact #64, C.R 
532 & 540); 
b) The court found that Ronald was entitled to relief 
as of the August 10, 1994 date on which he served his 
Petition to Modify yet the court ordered relief to be 
effective from January 1, 1995 and giving no explanation for 
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the delay (Findings of Fact #67, C.R 540, 530) the effect 
said timing is to contribute approximately $12,000 to a 
total shortfall calculation resulting in a lump sum judgment 
of $13,623 which by the court's own finding, Gail neither 
needs, nor does Ronald have the ability to pay; 
(Conclusions of Law, C.R. 530, 532) 
c) The court failed to vacate a contempt order 
against Ronald made without findings subsequent to the May 
30, 1995 OSC hearing even though the findings of fact later 
published clearly state that the appellant did not have the 
ability to comply with the violated order (ibid.) Further, 
the court added additional sanctions for the contempt 
ordering him to perform 50 hours of community service. 
(Conclusions of Law, C.R. 529, 530). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ronald argues that the trial judge failed to follow the 
statute when presented with a formal request for recusal, that 
once his neutrality had been questioned the judge should have, 
but did not refer the matter to another judge, nor did he recuse 
himself as requested as required by Rule 63(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
II. 
The court misread Ronald's income tax return and drew 
untenable conclusions from information contained therein. 
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Further, the court made augmentations to Ronald's income that are 
clearly arbitrary and based upon no particular reason other than 
to say that parties almost always inflate their expenses. The 
court also made assumptions about what was or was not included in 
the financial declaration when a reading of the detail of the 
declaration itself would have obviated the need to make said 
assumptions and that said assumptions are simply wrong. 
III. 
The trial court failed to terminate alimony despite 
referring itself to the proper test as contained in Bridenbaugh 
and making findings that affirm the test was met. The court did 
not make the legal conclusion that the findings would reasonably 
support. 
IV. 
Here again, in spite of making findings that Ronald was 
entitled to relief as of his August 10, 1994 petition filing date 
and that Gail's new professional employment which commenced also 
in August 1994, placed her in a self-sufficient condition, the 
court concluded that relief should be effective January 1, 1995 
and did not explain the reason for this apparent inconsistency. 
The explanation the court did give appears to reveal that the 
court was probably not cognizant of the pertinent statute 
permitting an order to be effective the date the petition is 
served. 
\\ 
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V. 
The court made no findings at the time it found Ronald in 
contempt for "willful refusal" to pay interim alimony of $1,000 
per month, therefore it lacked jurisdiction to make such an 
order. At trial the Court subsumed the interim order into an 
order of only $250 per month saying in effect that the $1,000 was 
beyond Ronald's ability to pay. Notwithstanding these eventual 
findings of fact the court without explanation refused to revisit 
the earlier contempt order and added criminal sanctions by 
ordering 50 hours of community service. 
VI. 
The court overstepped itf s bounds by concluding that child 
support for a 21-year-old son was due for January and February, 
1994 where a stipulated modification order filed February 11, 
1994 already covered that period of time making the matter res 
judicata. Also the court issued no findings of fact regarding 
the child's eligibility for support under the original decree 
which was proper because no evidence was taken on the issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
RONALD'S JUNE 5, 1995 "REQUEST FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE ANTHONY 
SCHOFIELD" SHOULD HAVE BEEN VIEWED AS AN AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS 
OR PREJUDICE WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 63(b) AND IN ISSUING 
HIS OWN RULING DENYING THE REQUEST THE JUDGE FAILED TO 
FOLLOW THE LAW. 
It should be noted that the document entitled "Request for 
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Recusal of Judge Anthony Schofield" was filed by Ronald on June 
5, 1995, the very day Ronald dismissed his counsel. Said filing 
was Ronald's first act as a party without counsel. Ronald 
believes that the aforesaid document represents his best effort 
at conveying to the court his belief that the court's neutrality 
had been affected. 
Though perhaps unartfully drafted, the document was clear as 
to substance and sufficient as to content insomuch that it 
contained all the essential elements of an affidavit of bias or 
prejudice contemplated in Rule 63(b). Further, in his own June 
7, 1995 ruling denying the request to recuse, Judge Schofield 
appears to clearly understand the request and confronts the issue 
head-on by offering his own version of the underlying facts. 
Ronald does not agree with the judge concerning said facts: 
a) Ronald believes it implausible that the communication 
between two teenaged co-workers would be limited to what one 
girl's mother's attorney thinks of the other's father's abilities 
as judge over a complex case. Indeed, Ronald was informed by his 
former counsel that said communications were more prosaic and 
included a rendition of facts prejudicial to Ronald; 
b) Ronald was further informed by his former counsel that 
during the meeting in chambers, the judge offered to disqualify 
himself should either party so request; 
c) At no time did Ronald "agree[d] that recusal was not 
warranted" as the judge asserts in his June 7 ruling. Ronald, 
when asked by counsel if he wanted a new judge responded that he 
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was too upset at that moment to give a thoughtful answer and 
wanted time to consider his decision. Ronald was already 
distressed to learn upon his arrival in Utah to attend trial on 
his petition to modify, that the trial for which he had incurred 
considerable expense had that very morning been postponed for 
three months at opposing counsel's in-chambers request. 
Approximately one month after the judge's disclosure, Ronald 
learned of two decisions the judge had recently made which Ronald 
considered a manifestation of actual prejudice against him: the 
first being the court's May 23, 1995 signing of a proposed "Order 
From Evidenciary [sic] Hearing January 30, 1995" over Ronald's 
timely objection thereto without first addressing the objection; 
the second being the court's finding Ronald guilty of contempt 
without a finding of the existence of the necessary elements 
thereof. This contempt order is one of the issues of this appeal 
argued hereinafter. 
As to the proper course of action when the neutrality of the 
judge is questioned the language of the law is clear: 
"Whenever a party to any action or proceeding or his 
attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the 
judge before whom such action or proceeding is to be 
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against 
such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite 
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further 
therein, except to call in another judge to hear and 
determine the matter." - Rule 63(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
This Court has further restated the judge's options: 
According to Rule 63(b), "once a party or counsel files 
an affidavit charging that the judge harbors prejudice 
or bias toward the party or counsel, the judge has two 
courses of action. First, if the point made in the 
13 
affidavit is well-taken, the judge can simply recuse 
himself and transfer responsibility for the case to 
another judge. Alternatively, if the judge 'questions 
the legal sufficiency' of the affidavit and accordingly 
believes recusal may be unnecessary, then he can refer 
the affidavit to another judge to determine whether 
there is sufficient rationale in the affidavit to 
prompt recusal. No other option is available under the 
rule." - Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 682 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
In his June 7, 1995 ruling denying the request for recusal, Judge 
Schofield appears to be relying upon the Code of Judicial Conduct 
which requires a judge to enter his own disqualification in a 
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might be questioned. 
(see June 7, 1995 Ruling, page 2). This reliance appears to be 
misplaced in this case since his impartiality was in fact 
questioned, in writing, by a party. In the circumstances then 
presented, Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should 
have been followed. 
Ronald believes there can be little doubt that Judge 
Schofield did not follow Rule 63(b) when he issued his own minute 
ruling denying Ronald's request for recusal. In a parallel case 
the Utah Supreme Court opined, 
"If this rule means anything at all, it means what is 
plainly stated to the effect that the judge against 
whom the affidavit of bias and prejudice [is filed] 
thereafter cannot proceed to hear the issue himself. 
Our only conclusion is that any order of judgement 
based on evidence thereafter taken by him would be 
ineffective against the affiant. It follows that this 
case must be remanded for another trial on the 
issues." Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 
265 (1962). 
Justice McDonough further observed that there might be merit in 
an argument that a Judge's refusal to comply with Rule 63(b) 
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"might be indicative of the asserted prejudice; and somewhat 
demonstrates the wisdom the rule itself." Ibid. 
It will be shown that subsequent rulings by the trial judge 
in the instant case appear to validate the observation of Justice 
McDonough. 
II. 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS WITH REGARD TO RONALD'S BUSINESS AND 
PERSONAL EXPENSES ARE BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION 
OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND ITS CONCLUSIONS DRAWN 
THEREON ARE UNTENABLE. 
Judge Schofield lists 89 "findings of fact" in his ruling. 
Number 51 thereof reads: 
"Gail disputes Ronald's claimed expenses. For example 
in 1994 he incurred $11,772 in secretarial expenses, 
yet his new wife Sharon, from whom he rented his office 
space, incurred no secretarial expenses for her travel 
agency. This gives rise to the question of whether 
Ronald included his wife's agency's secretarial 
expenses with his own business expenses. Further, in 
1994 Ronald paid $7,800 in rent for office space in a 
building owned by Sharon. Sharon's total mortgage 
payment for the building is $11,008. She runs her 
travel agency in the building and she rents another 
space to a third party for $2,104. Between the rental 
payments from Ronald and the third party, she covers 
almost all of her mortgage expense even though she also 
runs her travel agency from the building. This gives 
rise to the question of whether Ronald is claiming 
Sharon's agency's rental expenses with his business 
expenses." 
In "Finding" number 52 the judge concludes: 
"It is unfair for Ronald to cover all of these expenses 
for his wife's business. I divide each in half and 
conclude that for 1994 he had net income of $32,501 
(22,715 claimed net income + 1/2 X 7,800 + 1/2 X 
11,772)." 
In an effort to marshal evidentiary support for the above, Ronald 
finds only Defendant's Exhibit #3 - "1994 Joint Federal Income 
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Tax Return" filed by Ronald and his new wife. All the financial 
data analyzed by the court are contained in this one document. 
Though her trial counsel presented theories in his opening 
argument, no evidence was presented at trial that might suggest 
any challenge by the appellee to Ronald's claimed expenses. The 
trial judge's conclusions, which are stated above, hang solely 
upon his analysis of the two Schedules "C" contained in Ronald's 
1994 Joint Income Tax Return (Defendant's Exhibit #3) - one 
Schedule "C" for Ronald's financial services business, the other 
for the travel agency business owned by Sharon, Ronald's new 
wife. 
It should be noted that Part "II", line 26 of Ronald's 
Schedule "C" is labelled "Wages" and there is no amount entered 
there. However, in Part "V - Other expenses" there is an entry 
labelled "secretarial expenses" showing the amount of $11,772 to 
which the judge refers. 
The trial judge erred when he based his conclusion of 
improper allocation of expenses upon his observation that Sharon 
"incurred no secretarial expenses for her travel agency." It is 
probable that the judge compared the Parts "V" of each Schedule 
"C" and found no entry on Sharon's Schedule "C" for "secretarial 
services" as is found on Ronald's Schedule "C". The judge failed 
to observe that Part "II", line 26 of Sharon's Schedule "C" lists 
the amount of $28,737 as "wages" expense. 
The trial judge also erred in finding Sharon's total 
mortgage payment for the building to be $11,008. Actually the 
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amount the court cites was taken from line 16a, Part "II" of 
Sharon's Schedule "C" and represents only the interest portion of 
her mortgage. The judge fails to take into account the other 
expenses associated with building ownership, including insurance, 
maintenance, repairs, property taxes and utilities all of which 
are itemized therein. 
Nevertheless, these facts are immaterial since it is not 
proper to consider _size of mortgage payment as a basis for 
imputing rents. Rents are determined by the marketplace. It is 
common knowledge that mortgage payments can vary dramatically, 
not only with various interest rates, but with the level of 
equity the owner holds. By the judge's reasoning, an owner who 
has invested all cash into the purchase of her building and 
therefore has no mortgage, would not be entitled to the same rent 
as an owner who invests little cash and consequently has a very 
large mortgage payment. Nor, in the judge's view, would an owner 
be properly entitled to free rent for her own business located in 
her own building after having made a substantial cash investment 
in that building. Such conclusions are obviously untenable. 
A. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT RONALD'S SECRETARIAL 
EXPENSE AND OFFICE RENT SHOULD BE REDUCED BY ONE-HALF IS 
ARBITRARY AND AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND MAY RUN 
AFOUL OF UTAH'S CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT. 
The trial judge concludes, in effect, that Ronald's claimed 
expenses are overstated. Such a conclusion is supported only by 
the misreading of documentary evidence and untenable analysis 
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discussed above and is contrary to other evidence in the record 
as Defendant's Exhibit #8 - "The Price of Independence." (See 
Addendum) This document lists the national averages for expenses 
incurred by all independent financial services offices affiliated 
with the same company as the one operated by Ronald. 
According to Defendant's Exhibit #8, the national average 
for secretarial services expense is $14,400 per year (12 X 
$1,200). Yet Ronald claimed only $11,772 which is $2,628 or 18% 
below the national average. The same evidence also shows a 
national average for rent and utilities totalling $9,420 per year 
($650 X 12) + ($135 X 12). Yet Ronald paid just $7,800 rent in 
1994 (including utilities) which is $1,620 or 17% less than the 
national average. One might argue that national averages don't 
apply in every case because rents and wages can vary from state 
to state. Such an observation is true enough, however Ronald's 
office is located in the state of California where judicial 
notice can be taken that rents and wages tend to be above the 
national average. 
It would appear that the intended effect of the trial 
judge's conclusion that certain of Ronald's expenses are 
overstated is to form a financial basis for an order of child 
support and alimony that could not be otherwise justified. In 
this regard it is curious that the only expenses the judge 
questions are those which involve or may involve Sharon, Ronald's 
new wife. 
This fact seems to suggest that the judge may harbor a 
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belief that Sharon may have substantial assets that should be 
factored into this case* However, Utah's Civil Liability For 
Support Act requires that the obligation of child support rests 
solely with the natural or adoptive parents: 
"Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating 
each parent's share of the base combined child support 
obligation. Only income of the natural or adoptive 
parents of the child may be used to determine the award 
under these guidelines." - Sec. 78-45-7.4 Utah Code 
Ann. 
Defendant's Exhibits #5 and #6 were introduced at trial to show 
that Sharon made withdrawals from Jier G.I. Global mutual fund 
account during 1994 totalling $25,000 and that these withdrawals 
were necessary in order to meet household shortfalls created by 
her husband's (Ronald's) diminished ability to pay the nearly 
$3,000 per month in support payments to the his ex-wife. (See 
Addendum) 
It follows that the judge's actions in shifting a portion of 
Sharon's income away from her and onto Ronald has the effect of 
placing part of the burden for support on Sharon's shoulders and 
runs afoul of Sec. 78-45-7.4. Knowing that there could be a 
tendency with some obligor parties to attempt to conceal income 
by various means including improper payments to a new spouse it 
is possible therefore to understand a trial judge's tendency to 
scrutinize the data. However, no such attempt to conceal or 
misrepresent is evident here. Ronald paid more support than 
would have been considered xeaiistic by any objective standard 
(See Conclusions of Law - Alimony and Child Support Reduction, 
first paragraph, C.R. 532). In the instant case, the court's 
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presumption of guilt is arbitrary and as such appears to be a 
veiled attempt to circumvent the statute against inclusion of 
income of a non-parent. There is much wisdom in preventing the 
courts from taking into account the income or assets of a new 
spouse for she is not a party to the matter and may have other 
children to support or financial burdens she must bear and about 
which the court would have incomplete knowledge. Excessive 
support orders that adversely impact upon the standard of living 
of a new spouse are patently unfair and can lead to new marital 
strain or worse. 
B. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING RONALD'S PERSONAL 
EXPENSES GENERALLY AND HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
SPECIALLY ARE ERRONEOUS ON THEIR FACE. 
In "finding" #65 the trial judge writes: 
"Ronald asserts living expenses of $2,538, claiming 
that this amount is one-half of the actual expenses for 
him and his new wife Sharon. I assume that this 
includes his child support obligation of $298, since he 
has never denied that he owes at least $300 per month 
in child support. Since no evidence of these expenses 
was provided, I am unable to evaluate their accuracy, 
although Gail did not attacK Ronaldfs statement of 
expenses on cross-examination." (C.R. 540) 
Ronald cannot reconcile the judge's assumption that his financial 
declaration already contains his child support obligation of $298 
per month. It is Ronald's understanding that the purpose of the 
financial declaration is to determine such obligation and indeed 
there is no place on the declaration form for such an amount 
except as applies to obligations from a prior marriage. Further, 
it was unnecessary for the judge to assume at all where each item 
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is specifically listed and it is clear on its face that no such 
deduction is contained therein. 
The effect of the judge's assumption that child support is 
already included is to further create artificial capacity to pay 
alimony as evidenced by his "finding" #66: 
"Ronald has monthly income of $2,708 per month, or a 
surplus of $170 above his expenses. Assuming there is 
some fluff in his living expenses, as there almost 
always is, I conclude Ronald has some greater capacity 
to pay alimony. I fix alimony in the sum of $250 per 
month." 
Not only does Judge Schofield inflate Ronald's income by denying 
his proper business expenses as argued above, the judge here 
again misconstrues the documents before him resulting in a 
mistaken and unfair conclusion that Ronald has capacity to pay 
alimony. 
The judge inflates Ronald's capacity even further by making 
yet another assumption that there is "some fluff J_n his living, 
as there almost always is." The Financial Declaration is 
understood by Ronald to be a sworn statement made under penalty 
of perjury and was prepared by Ronald without assistance from 
counsel. Ronald went to trial ready to show proof of every item 
thereon and that he rounded down so as to better withstand the 
anticipated scrutiny of cross-examination. Ronald takes great 
exception therefore to the judge's assumption as to "fluff" and 
feels he has been prejudiced by the fact that lie was not cross-
examined on these expenses. Further, Ronald feels it is 
prejudicial to assume wrongdoing in a particular case based 
solely upon wrongdoing in other cases involving other parties. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED IT'S OWN FINDINGS AND FAILED TO 
FOLLOW THE LAW IN AWARDING CONTINUED ALIMONY. 
The test for determining whether alimony should be terminated has 
been well defined by this Court: 
"In order to reduce or terminate alimony, the court 
'must be persuaded that appellant will be able to 
support herself at a standard of living to which she 
was accustomed during the parties' marriage, or that 
respondent is no longer able to pay.'" Bridenbaugh v. 
Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241,242 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 
quoting Fullmer, v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988). 
In "finding" #64 Judge Schofield writes, "While Gail may consider 
the modification of her alimony to be a harsh .result, the 
standard of living which she has maintained since the separation 
has exceeded that which she enjoyed during the marriage.." (C.R. 
541) Further, in his "Conclusions of Law - Alimony and Child 
Support Reduction", first paragraph therein, the judge writes, 
"On the other hand, Gail has completed her college 
training, obtained a teaching certificate and found 
employment as a full-time teacher. She now has the 
ability to support herself at a standard of living 
which is actually greater than she enjoyed during the 
marriage, largely because of Ronald's seal, at the time 
of the divorce, to undertake an unrealistic support 
obligation" [emphasis added]. (C.R. 532) 
It is apparent that the judge confuses the "standard of 
living" test with a cash flow shortfall to which he refers in his 
"finding" #59 (C.R. 542) and which he apparently uses as a basis 
for awarding her alimony even though under the Bridenbaugh test 
alimony is not warranted. 
22 
IV. 
THE JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT RELIEF BE EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 
1995 IS BASED UPON AN APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW. 
The record shows that the Petition to Modify was served upon the 
appellee on August 10, 1994. In his Conclusions of Law - Changed 
Circumstances—Ronald" paragraph four, Judge Schofield writes, 
"In 1994, the year, that Ronald petitioned for the 
modification at issue here, his total income had 
dropped to $32,501, or an average of $2,708 per month 
(imputing income to compensate for overstated 
expenses)." (C.R. 535) 
Further, in "finding" #67 the judge begins with the following: 
"Given the significant decrease in Ronald's capacity to 
pay, it is clear he would have been able to establish 
an entitlement to a reduction in alimony at the time 
that he filed his petition to modify." (C.R. 540) 
Given the judge's own findings and conclusions, relief 
should have been, and ordinarily would have been granted 
effective as of the August 10, 1994 petition notice date were it 
not for the judge's apparent lack of cognizance of the pertinent 
statute. According to the statute, 
"A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any 
period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition 
was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the 
petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the 
petitioner." Sec. 30-3-10.6(2) Utah Code Ann. 
Evidence that the court was unaware of the foregoing statute 
which would have permitted an earlier effective date can be found 
in the court's findings indicating relief was warranted as of the 
August 10, 1994 petition date as expressed in "finding" #67 
quoted above. The judge explained his decision to set relief 
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effective as of January 1, 1995 with the following: 
"Given the significant decrease in Ronald's capacity to 
pay, it is clear he would have been able to establish 
an entitlement to a reduction in alimony at the time 
that he filed his petition to modify. Further much of 
the delay in bringing this matter to trial is Gailfs 
fault, rather than Ronald's, because Gail and her 
counsel requested inappropriate discovery and sought 
continuances based upon personal circumstances over 
which Ronald had no control. The matter first was set 
for hearing in January, 1995. By that time Ronald 
clearly was entitled to relief. For those reasons, I 
conclude that alimony should be adjusted to $250 per 
month from January, 1955 to the present." - Finding of 
Fact #67. (C.R. 540) 
In the foregoing explanation, the judge appears to be 
struggling for a rationale for giving any retroactive effect at 
all to his order, citing delays in bringing the matter to trial 
which were not the fault of Ronald. This explanation is repeated 
in his "Conclusions of Law - Delinquent Support," paragraph four, 
"In fixing these amounts, I give retroactive effect to 
January, 1995 of the modification here order. Ronald 
served Gail with his petition to modify in August 1994 
and the matter first was set for hearing in January 
1995. In January 1995 Ronald's circumstances were such 
that this Court would have granted him relief if the 
matter had been heard at that time, and I find much of 
the fault for the delay in bringing this matter to 
trial to rest at Gail's doorstep. Accordingly I give 
retroactive effect to this modification to January 
1995." (C.R. 530) 
Again, the judge appears to be trying to justify giving any 
retroactive effect at all and at no time considers the 
possibility that retroactive effect might have been given to the 
August 10, 1994 petition date as allowed by the statute. 
Failure to set relief effective as of the August 1994 
petition date results is grievous consequences for Ronald making 
him liable for four months of support payments at the previous 
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"unrealistic" rates which Ronald cannot pay and for which Gail 
did not have need given her employment. In his "Conclusions of 
Law - Changed Circumstances—Gail" (C.R. 535,534) the judge 
confirms that Gail has been in her current full-time teaching 
position since August 1994. (C.R. 540) Based upon these findings 
then can the Court acquiesce to a ruling that allows the previous 
order of alimony of $2f465 and child support in the amount of 
$533 per month to continue four months beyond the date of the 
filing of the Petition to Modify? This misplaced effective date 
creates a support arrearage for 1994 of $13,623. (see 
"Conclusions of Law - Delinquent Support" last paragraph, C.R. 
529). The egregiousness of this result is laid bare by the 
court's own "Conclusions of Law - Alimony and Child Support 
Reduction" paragraph one, wherein the judge concludes, "he 
[Ronald] has no assets left to draw upon." {C.R. 532) 
V. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ORDER FINDING RONALD IN CONTEMPT AND ORDERING 
HIM TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE RULED NULL AND VOID FOR LACK 
OF JURISDICTION. 
Appellant was absent from a hearing on an Order to Show 
Cause scheduled for May 30, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. (the morning after 
the Memorial Day Holiday). 
His former counsel was in attendance and Ronald was standing 
by at a telephone in California at his counsel's suggestion 
should a need arise. Without making any findings of fact, the 
court ordered Ronald in contempt for falling behind in his 
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payments, ordered him to pay $350 in attorneys fees with further 
sanctions to be reserved until trial. This order was filed on 
July 5, 1995 but not signed by the court as Ronald had filed a 
timely objection thereto. 
After trial the judge refused to revisit the contempt order 
in spite of the fact that his findings as heretofore shown, 
revealed that Ronald did not the have capacity to pay the amount 
required by the temporary order. It is well-established in law 
that a party cannot be found guilty of contempt where, 
" »* * * AS disclosed by the record, no findings of 
fact were made1 nor was it 'otherwise stated that the 
defendant had property, means, or present or any 
ability to comply with the decree or any part of the 
judgment or any order of the court with respect to the 
payment of any of the default payments, or that the 
defendant had willfully refused to pay any of such back 
installments, or that he had intentionally deprived 
himself of ability to comply therewith nor is it 
recited or otherwise indicated that the order of 
contempt or commitment was based on any evidence 
adduced before the court or on which the order of 
contempt and commitment was based. Because of the 
failure of the court to make findings in one or more of 
such particulars or the equivalent thereof, unless 
waived, of which there is no evidence, the order or 
judgment of the court adjudging the defendant guilty of 
contempt for failure to pay the installments as decreed 
has no support, and thus was rendered without 
jurisdiction, and is null and void.1" Parish v. 
McConkie, 35 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1934) quoting from Ex 
parte Gerber, (Utah) 29 P.2d 932, 933 and Hillyard v. 
District Court, 68 Utah, 220, 249 P. 806 
The trial court's initial order of contempt, though never 
signed, was not supported by the required findings. When 
findings were made subsequent to trial, those findings fail to 
support a contempt order, yet the order of contempt was not 
revisited in the final judgment except to add criminal sanctions 
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upon Ronald (see "findings" #86 & #87, C.R.537, 536). 
In "finding" #83, the judge reasserted his previous order 
awarding $350 in attorney's fees pursuant to the May 30, 1995 OSC 
hearing. Yet in "finding" #84, he plainly states, "Ronald does 
not have the capacity to pay Gail's attorney's fees. Further, he 
substantially prevailed in his Petition to modify. It is 
inappropriate for him to pay Gail's attorney's fees. None are 
awarded." (C.R. 537) Here the trial court made no finding of 
capacity to pay attorney's fees pursuant to the May 30, 1995 
hearing other than that finding pronounced above. It would 
appear from the circumstances that the order of attorney's fees 
was intended as punishment against Ronald and not designed to 
remedy any deficiency. 
In his "finding" #87 and "Conclusions of Law - Sanctions" 
the trial judge ordered Ronald to perform 50 hours of community 
service "as sanctions for Ronald's contempt". (C.R. 536) Such 
sanctions do not remedy an alleged deficiency as required by 
civil contempt conventions, but are designed instead to punish 
Ronald in order to uphold the integrity of the court. Such 
sanctions constitute criminal contempt sanctions and cannot be 
imposed without proper due process. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT MADE A CALCULATION OF SUPPORT 
DUE FOR 1994 WHICH INCLUDED A TWO-MONTH PERIOD ALREADY 
COVERED BY A PREVIOUS MODIFICATION ORDER AND ASSUMED ALL 
CHILDREN WERE ELIGIBLE FOR SUPPORT DURING SAID PERIOD. 
In his "Conclusions of Law - Delinquent Support" third 
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paragraph, Judge Schofield calculates the amount of child support 
that should have been due for 1994 under a combination of the 
original order, the first amended order and the new order• (C.R. 
530) Where the original order specified child support be paid at 
the rate of $1,600 per month for three children as long as 
certain conditions were met. No testimony was ever rendered or 
evidence received that would indicate whether or not the 21-year-
old son stood in compliance with these requirements during the 
first two months of 1994. The matter was considered moot by the 
parties who themselves believed that said child was ineligible 
due to his attainment of age 21 in August 1993 as provided by the 
stipulated modification order entered February 11, 1994. Since 
the parties both saw the matter as moot, no evidence was 
submitted so no findings on this issue were made. 
Should the evidence, had any been taken, have shown that the 21-
year old was not living at home in the months of January and 
February 1994, and attending college, as required by the original 
decree,then the amount of child support due for those months 
would be reduced by $1,066 (2 mos X $533). This condition was 
not considered by the trial court in making the calculation for 
1994 child support due. 
Further, even had there been a showing that the 21-year-old 
were eligible for support prior to the first modification, any 
questions of arrearages on the original order should have been 
addressed in the first modification. Therefore, the inclusion of 
any alleged arrearages predating the February 1994 modification 
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order must be barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the findings and conclusions under appeal either turn 
upon the documentary evidence or involve questions of law raised 
in the final order, the Court of Appeals is in as good a position 
as the trial court to assess the facts and circumstances and to 
review the case de novo. 
"Appellate court's review of decision allowing natural 
mother to revoke her consent to adoption was de novo; where trial 
court's decision was rendered solely on basis of documentary 
evidence." In re Infant Anonymous, 7 60 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); also, 11 A.L.R., Fed. 212, § 5. 
Should the Court agree that the trial judge failed to comply 
with Rule 63(b) in denying the appellant's Request for Recusal, 
in the interest of time and economy, the appellant would request 
a non-deferential de novo review of the issues rather than a 
remand for new trial which would be the course followed in the 
Anderson case. 
Therefore, the appellant seeks the following relief: 
1) Render ineffective any judgment against the appellant 
entered by Judge Schofield after June 5, 1995 on the grounds 
that the judge failed to properly address the recusal 
request as mandated by the rule; 
2) Review the issues presented herein de novo and find: 
a) That the court below improperly and erroneously 
imputed additional income of $9,786 per year to Ronald 
through a defective analysis of Ronald's 1994 Joint 
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Income Tax Return and Financial Declaration ana that 
Ronald's proper expenses both business and personal are 
as reported in the aforesaid documents; 
b) That it is unfair to continue alimony beyond the 
August 10, 1994 Petition date and that it be 
terminated as of said date as well as the requirement 
to name Gail as beneficiary on Ronald's life insurance; 
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both oarents as set forth in the oarties' Financial 
Declarations; 
d) That order entered against Ronald in his absence 
at the hearing of May 30, 1995 be vacated or pronounced 
null and void, including the order of contempt and 
attorney's fees and sanctions imposed or reasserted in 
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copying, binding and delivery costs of $200, 
DATED; September 4, 1996 
RONALD C. MONKS 
Appellant, Pro Se 
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Income Tax Return and Financial Declaration and that 
Ronaldfs proper expenses both business and personal are 
as reported in the aforesaid documents; 
b) That it is unfair to continue alimony beyond the 
August 10, 1995 Petition date and that it be 
terminated as of said date as well as the requirement 
to name Gail as beneficiary on Ronald's life insurance; 
c) That child support be set at the guideline amount 
for one child and based upon the levels of income of 
both parents as set forth in the parties' Financial 
Declarations; 
d) That order entered against Ronald in his absence 
at the hearing of May 30, 1995 be vacated or pronounced 
null and void, including the order of contempt and 
attorney's fees and sanctions imposed or reasserted in 
the final order; 
3) Order a refund of filing fees and cost bond as well as 
copying, binding and delivery costs of $200. 
DATED: August 8, 1996 
RONALD C. MONKS 
Appellant, Pro Se 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing APPELLANTS BRIEF by depositing the same in the U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, on the 9th day of August, 1996, addressed 
to the following: 
Keith L. Barton 
165 West Canyon Crest Road 
Alpine, Utah 84004 
DATED this 9th day of August, 1996 /O 
by: /A^^dj Yh^Jl^ 
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